


















A SIMPLIFIED AND GENERALIZED TREATMENT OF
DES RELATED CIPHERS
L. BABINKOSTOVA 1¶, A. M. BOWDEN2∗, A. M. KIMBALL3∗, AND K. J.
WILLIAMS1∗
Abstract. This work is a study of DES-like ciphers where the bit-
wise exclusive-or (XOR) operation in the underlying Feistel network is
replaced by an arbitrary group operation. We construct a two round
simplified version of DES that contains all the DES components and
show that its set of encryption permutations is not a group under func-
tional composition, it is not a pure cipher and its set of encryption
permutations does not generate the alternating group. We present a
non-statistical proof that for n ≤ 6 the set of n-round Feistel permuta-
tions over an arbitrary group do not constitute a group under functional
composition.
1. Introduction
The Data Encryption Standard (DES), now replaced by AES (the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard) as official symmetric key standard, has been
an official US government standard for more than 20 years. DES and its
variants are still commonly used in electronic financial transactions, secure
data communications, and the protection of passwords or PINs [21]. Being
the first commonly used modern block cipher, DES has undergone several
thorough security analyses. Components of the DES architecture are still
the fundamental building blocks for several contemporary symmetric key
systems.
The full description of DES is given in [28], but we begin describing the
details of DES that are relevant to this paper. DES is a 16-round Feistel
cipher acting on the space of 64-bit messages under the control of a 56-bit
key. A description of the Feistel cipher is given in [14]. Each Feistel round
is based on a round specific function f mapping 32-bit strings to 32-bit
strings. The function f is derived from the round number and from an
initial cryptographic key and involves both permutation and substitution
operations. It has four components:
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(1) An expansion permutation E which expands the right-half block y
from 32 bits to 48 bits.
(2) Key mixing which combines E(y) with the subkey ki used in round
i by means of the bitwise-XOR operation.
(3) Substitution which divides the block E(y)⊕ki into eight 6-bit blocks
and each 6-bit block is transformed into a 4-bit block according to
a non-linear transformation, provided in the form of a lookup table
(S-boxes).
(4) Permutation which rearranges the 32-bit output of the eight S-boxes
according to a fixed permutation.
Processing of a 64 bit block of data uses the bitwise exclusive-or (XOR)
operation defined on 48-bit strings. The set of 48-bit strings, denoted
{0, 1}48, endowed with the bitwise XOR operation denoted ⊕, is a group.
This group is in fact the external direct product1 of 48 copies of the group
Z2, which is the set {0, 1} endowed with the binary operation of modulo 2
addition.
For each key k, the corresponding DES encryption operation is a function,
say Tk, which maps 64-bit data blocks to 64-bit blocks, and thus Tk is a
function from {0, 1}64 to {0, 1}64. For each key k, Tk is a one-to-one (and
thus onto) function from {0, 1}64 to {0, 1}64, and thus a permutation of the
set {0, 1}64. We shall call the DES encryption functions DES permutations.
The set of DES permutations is a subset of the symmetric group S264 which
has (264)! elements.
If the set of DES permutations were closed under functional composition
(and thus a subgroup of S264) then multiple encryption using several DES
keys would be equivalent to a single encryption by a single DES key. In this
case security features of systems like Triple-DES would not exceed that of
DES. It has been known since the 1990’s that the set of DES encryption
permutations does not constitute a group under the operation of functional
composition. In [7] the authors presented a statistical test to show that the
indexed set of permutations is not closed under functional composition and
so is not a group.
Our work is a study of cryptosystems with DES-like architecture, but
for which the bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation in the underlying Feis-
tel network is replaced by a binary operation in an arbitrary finite group.
The idea of replacing the XOR operation in DES with another operation
has been considered by several authors: Biham and Shamir [4] show that
replacing some of the XOR operations in DES with additions modulo 2n,
makes their differential attack less powerful. Carter, Dawson, and Nielsen
[8] show a similar phenomenon when the XOR operation in DES is replaced
by addition using a particular Latin Square. Patel, Ramzan and Sundaram
[23] studied Luby-Rackoff ciphers over arbitrary finite groups. They con-
structed a four round Luby-Rackoff cipher, operating over finite groups of
1See Chapter 8 of [15] for information on external direct products.
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characteristic greater than 2, and showed that such a cipher is secure against
adaptive chosen plaintext and adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, has bet-
ter time/space complexity and uses fewer random bits than the previously
considered Luby-Rackoff ciphers based on the group Z2 with an XOR op-
eration. As with DES, the Luby-Rackoff cipher involves the use of Feistel
permutations independently keyed with pseudorandom functions.
Before our investigation there was no information on whether the set of
encryption permutations of such systems based on a different finite group
operation is closed under functional composition. We show that, in non-
pathological cases, for n ≤ 6 the set of encryption permutations generated
by n-round Feistel permutations is not closed under functional composition.
We must also note that we found a fairly simple deductive proof of this fact
instead using statistical tests as in [7].
Knowing the order of the group generated by the encryption permutations
is also an important algebraic question about the security of the cryptosys-
tem. Coppersmith and Grossman have shown [11] that in principle DES-like
components can generate any permutation of the alternating group A264 (all
even permutations, i.e. those that can be represented by an even number
of transpositions). In 1983 S. Even and O. Goldreich showed that DES-like
functions are contained within the alternating group [13]. Furthermore, in
1998 R. Wernsdorf [29] showed that the one-round encryption permutations
of DES generate the alternating group, A264 . It is still not known whether
16-round DES permutations generate the alternating group. Using the spe-
cial properties of the so called weak keys it has been shown in [10] that the
set of DES permutations generates a very large group, with a lower-bound
of 22499 for its size.
In [2] it is shown how the replacement of the XOR operation in the un-
derlying Feistel network of DES with binary operation in an arbitrary finite
group can affect which group is generated by the n-round DES permutations.
Since any direct analysis of DES is computationally intensive it is some-
times not feasible to directly analyze DES. Thus, simplified analogs of DES
have been introduced. Such simplified versions of DES were introduced by E.
Schaeffer (called S-DES) in [25], and W. Trappe and L. Washington (called
B-DES) in [27]. Both versions simulate the basic architecture of DES. As
with DES, the fundamental computational structure underlying these sim-
plified versions of DES is the group Z2 endowed with the XOR operation.
In [18], J. Konikoff and S. Toplosky, showed that the group of permutations
generated by these simplified versions of DES is in the case of S-DES the
alternating group on 256 elements and in the case of B-DES the alternating
group on 4096. As with DES, there was no information on whether or how
the security of corresponding analogs of S-DES or B-DES is affected when
the XOR operation is replaced with another group operation.
In this paper we introduce a new simplified version of DES, which we
call E-DES. The main innovation in E-DES is that we base it on the finite
group Z3 with the operation of modulo 3 addition. We show that its set
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of encryption permutations does not form a group under functional com-
position. We show this both by giving a deductive proof of the statement,
and by using the cycling closure test as was used in the case of DES for the
same question. Also, we show that the group generated by the E-DES per-
mutations is not the alternating group as it contains odd permutations. We
gave careful attention to the known original design criteria for components
of DES, particularly the substitution S-boxes, when we designed E-DES. We
also show that this cryptosystem is not pure, another important property
for the security of any cryptosystem.
Our construction of E-DES based on Z3 can be easily adjusted to develop
a cipher based on a finite group different from Z3 while preserving security
features of E-DES. In particular, one can use Elliptic Curve groups in antic-
ipation that several computationally hard problems for these groups may be
used to further enhance the security of a DES-like cryptosystem based on
these groups. An attempt for use of the Elliptic Curve groups in DES was
made in [1], but unfortunately not as replacement of the bitwise operation
in the underlying Feistel network.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we state several definitions
and give a general description of block ciphers based on multiple round
Feistel networks. In Section 3 we describe a technique of constructing Feistel
functions. In Section 4 we give the specifics of the design of our instance
of E-DES and give an example of an encryption in this system. In Section
5 we describe the cycling closure test and how it can be used to address
various questions about the algebraic structure of any finite cryptosystem.
Our results based on these tests address the question of whether the E-DES
encryption permutations constitute a group under functional composition,
whether the cryptosystem is pure and which group is generated by such
cryptosystems. In Section 6 we address these and other group theoretic
properties concerning of Feistel based block ciphers in general.
2. Definitions and Notation
We follow the notation and terminology of [16]. A cryptosystem is an
ordered 4-tuple (M, C, K, T ) where M, C, and K are called the message
space, the ciphertext space, and the key space respectively, and where T :
M× K → C is a transformation such that for each k ∈ K, the mapping
Tk :M→ C is invertible.
For any cryptosystem Π = (M, C, K, T ), let TΠ = {Tk : k ∈ K} be the
set of all encryption transformations. In addition, for any transformation
Tk ∈ T , let T
−1
k denote the inverse of Tk. In a cryptosystem where M = C
the mapping Tk is a permutation of M. We consider only cryptosystems
for which M = C. The set of all permutations of the set M is denoted SM.
Under the operation of functional composition SM forms a group called the
symmetric group over M. The symbol 〈TΠ〉 denotes the subgroup of SM
that is generated by the set TΠ.
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A cryptosystem Π is called closed if its set TΠ of encryption transforma-
tions is closed under functional composition i.e for every k1, k2 ∈ K there is
k3 ∈ K such that Tk1Tk2 = Tk3 . By Theorem 3.3 from [15] Π is closed if and
only if its set of encryption transformations TΠ is a group under functional
composition. Thus, the cryptosystem Π is closed if, and only if, TΠ = 〈TΠ〉.
In [26] Shannon generalized the idea of closed cipher. A cryptosystem is




Tk3 = Tk4 . One can show that Π is pure if and only if
for every T ∈ TΠ the set T
−1TΠ = {T
−1Tk : k ∈ K} forms a group under
functional composition. It is known that every closed cryptosystem is pure,
but not every pure cryptosystem is closed.
To analyze the algebraic properties of Feistel based ciphers it is also useful
to introduce the following definitions about permutation groups. For any
subgroup S ⊆ SM, for any m ∈ M, the set orbS(m) = {φ(m) : φ ∈ S} is
called the orbit of m under S. The set stabS(m) = {φ ∈ S : φ(m) = m} is
called the stabilizer of m in S. In Section 5 we will make use of the following
well-known theorem.
Theorem 1. Let S be a finite group of permutations of a set M . Then for
any m ∈M ,
| S |=| orbS(m) | · | stabS(m) |
3. Feistel Networks
A multi-round block cipher is a cipher involving the sequential applica-
tion of similar invertible transformations (called round functions or round
transformations) to the plaintext. All round transformations are usually
key-dependent and the transformation of round i obtains its own subkey
ki which is derived from the cipher key k using a key-schedule algorithm.
Feistel networks constitute an important design principle underlying many
block ciphers, including DES. They were described first by Horst Feistel
during his work at IBM on the cipher Lucifer [14].
Definition 1. Let (G,⊕) be a finite group. For a function f : Gt → Gt the
function σf : G
2t → G2tdefined by σf (x, y) = (y, x⊕ f(y)) is called a Feistel
function.
A Feistel network consists of repeated applications of Feistel functions
with different round functions f used in each round. By definition, a Feistel
network with n-rounds is the permutation function
Ψn2t(f1, f2, · · · , fn) = σf1 ◦ σf2 ◦ · · · ◦ σfn
Typically, the round functions are chosen to be highly nonlinear key-
dependent functions with good diffusion. A standard way to provide these
properties for the round functions is to use a substitution structure (S-
boxes).
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Let Ft(G) be the set of all functions f : G
t → Gt. The set Ft(G) admits
some operations. For f and g in Ft(G) we define f ⊙ g so that for each
y ∈ Gt,
(f ⊙ g)(y) = f(y)⊕ g(y).
The symbol “⊕” above denotes the group operation of the product group
Gt. Now (Ft(G), ⊙) is a group. Additionally, the functional composition
operation ◦ on Ft(G) will be featured.
A random Feistel network with n rounds, is a Feistel network in which
the round functions f1, · · · , fn are randomly and independently chosen func-
tions form the set Ft(G). These networks are also known as “Luby-Rackoff
constructions with n rounds”.
Lemma 2. Let (G,⊕) be a finite group. For each function f ∈ Ft(G) the
Feistel function σf is a permutation of the set G
t ×Gt.
Thus, for each function f ∈ Ft(G), the Feistel function σf is a member of
S|G2t|, the permutation group of the finite set G
t ×Gt.
3.1. Feistel functions derived from S-boxes. In several practical imple-
mentations of Feistel network based cryptosystems, including classical DES,
the members of Ft(G) are constructed in a very specific way from an input
key parameter, and a selected set of substitution tables called S-boxes. Much
of the security of a block cipher based on a Feistel network depends on the
properties of the substitution boxes (S-boxes) used in the round function.
The DES S-boxes are reported to have been designed to conform to a num-
ber of criteria as they are the part of the system where the cipher function
gets its security. For more details on the properties of the S-boxes used in
DES, see for example [10], [5], [6] and [9]. In this section we describe the
design of functions f : Gt → Gt where G is some finite group, from S-boxes.
An S-box is a lookup table with k = |G|i rows and m = |G|j columns.
The entries of an S-box will be conceived of as j-nit sequences over G. Let
n such S-boxes be given. The function f constructed from these n S-boxes
must be a function from Gt to Gt. Thus, the inputs of the function f will
be a t-nit 2 sequence of group elements.
This input is used to construct an output from the n S-boxes by reading
off from this input an S-box number and row-number and column-number
for that S-box, and then using the entries in these positions of the indicated
S-boxes to construct the output. There are several approaches to indicating
the S-boxes.
We require that all n S-boxes are “active” in constructing the value of
the function f . Thus, from the t-nit input we must read for each of the n S-
boxes the corresponding row- and column-information. Note that from our
specification of the S-box dimensions above, the row number can be coded
as an i-nit string of elements of G, while the column number can be coded
as a j-nit string of elements of G. Thus, to specify a row and column we
2here, nit (from “n-ary digit”, analogous to bit) means group element
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Figure 1. Calculation of f(R,K)
use an (i + j)-nit string, plus a convention indicating which i of these nits
to use in which specific ordering to select the row, and what ordering on the
remaining j-nits to use to select the column. Let such a row/column number
convention be fixed. To keep the selections from the S-boxes independent
of each other, we use an (i+ j)·n-nit string derived from the input element
of Gt, a t-nit string. The output is obtained by concatenating the n input-
indicated j-nit entries from each of the S-boxes, thus obtaining a (j·n)-nit
output. Thus, we require that t = j·n.
Since t < (i + j)·n, we expand the t-nit input using a carefully chosen
expansion function
E : Gt −→ G(i+j)·n.
The other input parameter to the S-box is an (i+j)·n-nit key, K. This key
and E(R), the expansion of the t-nit string R, is then used to construct the
input to the S-box. The input to the S-box is K⊕E(R) where the operation
⊕ is the nit-wise group operation on the product group G(i+j)·. The (i+ j)·n-
nit quantity K ⊕E(R) is separated into n blocks of consecutive (i+ j)-nits
each, with string number s designated as the row/column selection code for
S-box number s.
The output is obtained by concatenating the j-nit entries from each of
the S-boxes in canonical order to obtain a t-nit (t = j·n) output. Figure ??
illustrates this construction based on three S-boxes.
4. A simplified DES cipher based on Z3
We define a simplified version of DES, called E-DES, by declaring the
message-space M and the ciphertext space C to be M = C = {0, 1, 2}18 ,
and by declaring the key space K to be K = {0, 1, 2}20 . Figure 2 illustrates
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Figure 2. E-DES structure
the overall structure of this simplified DES cipher and Figure ?? illustrates
the round function f .
The inputs for the E-DES encryption algorithm are an 18-nit 3 block of
plaintext (example: 110120121220120121) and a 20-nit key. The algorithm
produces an 18-nit block of ciphertext as output. For a fixed key k the
function fk derived from the S-boxes as described before takes as input the
data passing through the encryption algorithm and a 15-nit subkey. The
mapping Tk defined from the key k by the E-DES encryption algorithm
involves the sequential application of functions and can be expressed as
Tk = P
−1 ◦ θ ◦ σfk2 ◦ σfk1 ◦ P.
where θ is the “swap” function
θ(x, y) = (y, x)
from Z183 to Z
18
3 .
Note that Θ = Θ−1. Recall that (f ◦ g)−1 = g−1 ◦ f−1. Then the




◦ θ ◦ P.
The inverse of σ−1fki
, i = 1, 2 is
σ−1fki
(x, y) = (x⊖ f(y), y),
where ⊖ is the operation subtraction modulo 3, the inverse group operation
in Z3.
3here, nit (from “n-ary digit”, analogous to bit) means group element
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The quantity k1 is a 15-nit subkey of the input key k and is derived from
k using the compression permutation
CP1 = ( 16 17 12 15 20 10 11 3 7 19 13 9 8 1 18 )
Similarly, k2 is a subkey of k obtained from k by using the compression
permutation
CP2 = ( 6 7 2 20 4 3 9 8 18 10 15 14 11 12 5 )
We shall now describe each of the functions constituting the encryption
permutation Tk. Following this description, we illustrate the algorithm by
going through the individual steps using an explicit input plaintext and an
explicit input key.
4.1. Initial and Final Permutations. The input to the algorithm is an
18-nit block of plaintext which is first permuted using the permutation
P = ( 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1811 12 2 13 9 1 5 8 16 17 4 18 15 7 10 3 6 14 ) .
For example, the initial permutation moves nit in position 6 of the plain-
text to position 1, the nit in position 3 of the plaintext to position 2, the nit
in position 16 of the plaintext to position 3, and so forth.
The final permutation is the inverse of P , and is the permutation
P−1 = ( 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 186 3 16 11 7 17 14 8 5 15 1 2 4 18 13 9 10 12 ) .
The initial permutation P and the corresponding final permutation P−1
do not affect the security of the cryptosystem.
4.2. The Expansion Permutation. This operation expands the right half
of the 18-nit data-block being processed from 9-nits to 15-nits by changing
the order of the nits as well as repeating certain nits. This operation has
two properties: It makes the right half the same size as the subkey for the
⊕mod 3 operation and it provides the appropriate length nit-sequence for use
during the substitution operation. The expansion permutation is given by
E = ( 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 ) .
4.3. The S-box substitution. The most fundamental encryption step in
E-DES, directly impacting the security of E-DES, is the application of the
substitution boxes, or S-boxes. There are three different S-boxes. Table 2
shows these three S-boxes. To achieve the “non-linearity” property and the
randomness of the output we used the following criteria in the design of the
S-boxes:
(1) No S-box is a linear or affine function of the input.
(2) Each “row” of an S-box contains all possible outputs.
Note that the entries displayed in Table 2 are ordinary integers between 0
and 26. Each S-box transforms a 5-nit input to a 3-nit output as follows:
The 15-nit result of the expansion permutation is divided into three 5-nit
sub-blocks. Each separate block is the input for a separate S-box: The first
10L. BABINKOSTOVA 1¶, A. M. BOWDEN2∗, A. M. KIMBALL3∗, AND K. J. WILLIAMS1∗
block is input for S-box 1, the second block is input for S-box 2 and the
third block is input for S-box 3.
Each S-box is a table of 9 rows and 27 columns. The rows are numbered
by 0 through 8, while the columns are numbered by 0 through 26. Each en-
try in the 9-by-27 S-box is, when expressed in base 3, a 3-nit number. The
5-nit input of an S-box specifies the row and column number of the S-box
entry that is the output for that input. This is done as done as follows: Let
n1, n2, n3, n4, and n5 be the 5 nits of input listed in order of occurrence in
the input. Nits n1 and n5 are combined to form 2-nit number in base 3, cor-
responding to one of the decimal numbers from 0 to 8: This decimal number
specifies a row number in the S-box under consideration. The middle 3 nits,
n2, n3, n4 are combined to form a 3-nit number in base 3, corresponding to
one of the decimal numbers from 0 to 26: This decimal number specifies
a column in the S-box under consideration. Here 00 corresponds to row 1,
and 000 corresponds to column 1.
For example, suppose that the input to the second S-box is 22010. The
first and the last nit combine to form 20, which corresponds to row number 6,
which is by our convention the seventh row, of the second S-box. The middle
3 nits combine to form 201, which correspond to the number 19, indicating
by our convention the 20-th column of the same S-box. The entry at the
intersection of the seventh row and twentieth column of S-box 2 is 11. Since
102 is the base 3 representation of 11, the 3-nit value 102 is the output from
S-box 2, given the 5-nit input 22010.
4.4. An example of an encryption using E-DES. We now describe
how E-DES encrypts the 18-nit message m = 012012012012012012 by using
the 20-nit key k = 11012012122012012110.
Apply initial permutation P to m:
m1 = P (m) = 121020110102200221.
The right half of m1 is
m2 = R(m1) = 102200221.
Apply the expansion map E to m2:
m3 = E(m2) = 110220022002211.
Apply the key compression map CP1 to k:
k1 = CP1(k) = 120002201111211.
In Z153 add m3 and k1:
m4 = m3 ⊕ k1 = 110220022002211 ⊕ 120002201111211 = 200222220110122.
Note that the group operation ⊕ here is nit-wise addition modulo 3.
Partition m4 into three 5-nit blocks before processing to the S-
boxes. Then the block 20022 becomes an input in S-box 1, 22201 an input
in S-box 2 and the last 5-nit block 10122 becomes an input in S-box 3.
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Table 1: S-boxes
S-box 1
24 25 6 16 3 7 1 18 26 5 10 9 19 23 13 12 15 8 20 17 2 11 0 21 14 4 22
17 18 26 9 23 0 21 11 19 25 3 2 12 16 6 5 8 1 13 10 22 4 20 14 7 24 15
16 17 25 8 22 26 20 10 18 24 2 1 11 15 5 4 7 0 12 9 21 3 19 13 6 23 14
10 11 19 2 16 20 14 4 12 18 23 22 5 9 26 25 1 21 6 3 15 24 13 7 0 17 8
21 22 3 23 0 4 25 15 23 2 7 6 16 20 10 9 12 5 17 14 26 8 24 18 11 1 19
26 0 8 18 5 9 3 20 1 7 12 11 21 25 15 14 17 10 22 19 4 13 2 23 16 6 24
3 4 12 22 9 13 7 24 5 11 16 15 25 2 19 18 21 14 26 23 8 17 6 0 20 10 1
5 6 14 24 11 15 9 26 7 13 18 17 0 4 21 20 23 16 1 25 10 19 8 2 22 12 3
11 12 20 3 17 21 15 5 13 19 24 23 6 10 0 26 2 22 7 4 16 25 14 8 1 18 9
S-box 2
1 2 10 20 7 11 5 22 3 9 14 13 23 0 17 16 19 12 24 21 6 15 4 25 18 8 26
25 26 7 17 22 8 2 19 0 6 11 10 20 24 14 13 16 9 21 18 3 12 1 22 15 5 23
14 15 23 6 20 24 18 8 16 22 0 26 9 13 3 2 5 25 10 7 19 1 17 11 4 21 12
9 10 18 1 15 19 13 3 11 17 22 21 4 8 25 24 0 20 5 2 14 23 12 6 26 16 7
23 24 5 15 2 6 0 17 25 4 9 8 18 22 12 11 14 7 19 16 1 10 26 20 13 3 21
2 3 11 21 8 12 6 23 4 10 15 14 24 1 18 17 20 13 25 22 7 16 5 26 19 9 0
18 19 0 10 24 1 22 12 20 26 4 3 13 17 7 6 9 2 14 11 23 5 21 15 8 25 16
15 16 24 7 21 25 19 9 17 23 1 0 10 14 4 3 6 9 13 8 20 2 18 12 5 22 13
2 23 4 14 1 5 26 16 24 3 8 7 17 21 11 10 13 16 18 15 0 9 25 19 12 2 20
S-box 3
4 5 13 23 10 14 8 25 6 12 17 16 26 3 20 19 22 15 0 24 9 18 7 1 21 11 2
6 7 15 25 12 16 10 0 8 14 19 18 1 5 22 21 24 17 2 26 11 20 9 3 23 13 4
7 8 16 26 13 17 11 1 9 15 20 19 2 6 23 22 25 18 3 0 12 21 10 4 24 14 5
8 9 17 0 14 18 12 2 10 16 21 20 3 7 24 23 26 19 4 1 13 22 11 5 25 15 6
13 14 22 5 19 23 17 7 15 21 26 25 8 12 2 1 4 24 9 6 18 0 16 10 3 20 11
12 13 21 4 18 22 16 6 14 20 25 24 7 11 1 0 3 23 8 5 17 26 15 9 2 19 10
19 20 1 11 25 2 23 13 21 0 5 4 14 18 10 7 10 3 15 12 24 6 22 16 9 26 17
0 1 9 19 6 10 4 21 2 8 13 12 22 26 16 15 18 11 23 20 5 14 3 24 17 7 25
20 21 2 12 26 3 24 14 22 1 6 5 15 19 9 8 11 4 16 13 25 7 23 17 10 0 18
Determine the 3-nit output of each S-box:
S-box 1: The first and last nits of this block form 22, which corresponds to
row number 8, the ninth row. The middle three nits form 002, which corre-
sponds to column number 2, which is the third column. The entry in row
8, column 2 of S-box 1 is the decimal number 20. The base 3 representation
of 20 is 202, so the output for S-box 1 is 202.
S-box 2: The second S-box input is 22201. The first and last nits of this
block form 21, which corresponds to row number 7, which is the eight row
of S-box 2. The middle three nits form 220, which corresponds to column
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number 24 which is the twenty-fifth column of S-box 2. The entry in row 7,
column 24 of S-box 2 is the decimal number 5. The base 3 representation
of 5 is 012, so the output for S-box 2 is 012.
S-box 3: The third S-box input is 10122. The first and last nits of this
block form 12, which corresponds to row number 5, which is the sixth row
of S-box 3. The middle three nits form 012, which corresponds to column
number 5, which is the sixth column of S-box 3. The entry in row 5, column
5 of S-box 3 is the decimal number 19. The base 3 representation of 22 is
211, so the output for S-box 3 is 211.
Determine the 12-nit output from the S-boxes:
Concatenating these three S-box outputs in order gives the combined
output
m5 = 202012211.
In the group Z3, add m5 to the left half of m1: The left half of m1 is
m6 = 121020110. This step gives
m7 = m6 ⊕m5 = 020002021
Combine m2 and m7 by left-right swap:
e1 = Θ(m7,m2) = 102200221020002021
This completes the first of the two Feistel rounds of E-DES. The right half
of e1 is e2 = R(e1) = 020002021.
Apply the expansion map E to e2:
e3 = E(e2) = 102000200020210.
Apply the key compression map CP2 to k:
k2 = S2(k) = 011010121202202.
In Z153 add e3 and k2:
e4 = e3 ⊕ k2 = 102000200020210 ⊕ 011010121202202 = 110010021222112.
Partition e4 into three 5-nit blocks. Then the block 11001 becomes an
input in S-box 1, 00212 an input in S-box 2 and the last 5-nit block 22112
becomes an input in S-box 3.
Determine the 3-nit output of each S-box:
S-box 1: The first and last nits of this block form 11, which corresponds
to row number 4, the fifth row. The middle three nits form 100, which cor-
responds to column number 9, which is the tenth column. The entry in row
4, column 9 of S-box 1 is the decimal number 2. The base 3 representation
of 2 is 002, so the output for S-box 1 is 002.
S-box 2: The second S-box input is 00212. The first and last nits of this
block form 02, which corresponds to row number 2, which is the third row
of S-box 2. The middle three nits form 021, which corresponds to column
number 7 which is the eighth column of S-box 2. The entry in row 2, column
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7 of S-box 2 is the decimal number 8. The base 3 representation of 8 is 022,
so the output for S-box 2 is 022.
S-box 3: The third S-box input is 22112. The first and last nits of this
block form 22, which corresponds to row number 8, which is the ninth row
of S-box 3. The middle three nits form 211, which corresponds to column
number 22, which is the twenty-third column of S-box 3. The entry in row
8, column 22 of S-box 3 is the decimal number 23. The base 3 representation
of 23 is 212, so the output for S-box 3 is 212.
Determine the 12-nit output from the S-boxes:
Concatenating these three S-box outputs in order gives the combined
output
e5 = 002022212.
In the group Z3, add e5 to the left half of e1: The left half of e1 is
e6 = 102200221. This step gives
e7 = e6 ⊕ e5 = 101222100.
Concatenate e7 and e2 to form e7e2:
e8 = e7e2 = 101222100020002021.
Apply the final permutation, P−1 to e8:
c = P−1(e8) = 210212002210210000.
Now c = 210212002210210000 is the ciphertext output when E-DES is
applied to the input plaintext m = 012012012012012012, using the key
k = 11012012122012012110.
5. Cycling closure experiments on simplified Feistel networks
over certain finite groups
We give a general overview of the cycling closure test. The cycling closure
test can be used to address various questions about the algebraic structure
of any finite cryptosystem. The test was used in [7] and in [10] to give a
conclusive proof that the set of permutations in the classical DES is not
closed and to determine the lower bound on the size of the subgroup gener-
ated by the DES permutations. We performed this test on several simplified
versions of DES over certain finite groups.
Assume that the subset TΠ of the group SymG2t is closed under compo-
sition. Then for any key k ∈ K the order of the encryption permutation Tk
divides the order of TΠ. Recall that |TΠ| ≤ |K|. Thus, in particular, the
order of Tk is no larger than |K|. By the Orbit-Stabilizer theorem it follows
that for any message x ∈ M we have |orb〈Tk〉(x)| divides the order of the
cyclic group 〈Tk〉, and thus
|orb〈Tk〉(m)| ≤ |K|.
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More generally, for messages x1, x2, · · · , xm we have
lcm{|orb〈Tk〉(xi)| : i ≤ m} ≤ |K|.
If it happens that for a key k and messages x1, · · · , xm
lcm{|orb〈Tk〉(xi)| : i ≤ m} > |K|
then we have that TΠ is not closed and therefore not a group.
Thus to test a cryptosystem for some algebraic weaknesses such as closure
and purity one has to examine the orbits of subsets of encryption transfor-
mations on particular messages. The method is to compute the orbits of
single encryption and to apply the cycling closure test to subsets of two or
more encryption transformations. The cycling closure test picks an initial
messagem at random and then takes a pseudorandom walk in TΠ, beginning
at m. For each step of the pseudorandom walk, the previous ciphertext is
encrypted under a key chosen by a pseudorandom function of the previous
ciphertext. The walk continues until a cycle is detected. By the Birthday
Paradox the walk is expected to cycle after approximately | TΠ |
1/2 steps.
Recall the definition of purity of a cryptosystem. To determine the purity
of the cryptosystem using the cycling closure test we first need show the
following statement.
Lemma 3. A cryptosystem Π is pure if and only if for some T ∈ TΠ the
set T−1TΠ = {T
−1 ◦ Tk : k ∈ K} is closed under functional composition.
Proof: Let T ∈ TΠ be an encryption permutation for which the set T
−1TΠ
is closed under functional composition. Then, for each Ti, Tj ∈ TΠ and each
T ∈ TΠ there exist Tk ∈ TΠ such that (T
−1 ◦ Ti) ◦ (T
−1 ◦ Tj) = T
−1 ◦ Tk.
But, then
T ◦ (T−1 ◦ Ti) ◦ (T
−1 ◦ Tj) = T ◦ T
−1 ◦ Tk
or Ti ◦ T
−1 ◦ Tj = Tk which means that Π is pure.
Now, let assume that Π is pure. Then for each Ti, Tj , Tk ∈ TΠ there exists
Tl ∈ TΠ such that Ti ◦ T
−1
j ◦ Tk = Tl. But, then for each T ∈ TΠ,
(T−1 ◦ Ti ◦ T
−1
j ) ◦ (T
−1 ◦ Tk) = T
−1 ◦ Tl
This implies that for some T ∈ TΠ the set T
−1TΠ is closed. ♦
5.1. Orbit Test. Given any key k and any message m, compute xi =
T ik(m), i = 1, 2, · · · for a specified numbers of steps or until a cycle is de-
tected.
5.2. Purity Test. Pick any encryption T ∈ TΠ and apply the cycling clo-
sure test to the set T−1 ◦ TΠ.
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5.3. Small Subgroup Test. Pick any keys k1, k2, · · · ks and any message
m apply the cycling closure test to the set {Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tks} T ∈ TΠ to
obtain a statistical lowerbound of the group 〈Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tks〉.
We developed a software to implement these tests on a 2-round simplified
version of DES with two randomly chosen S-boxes where the group operation
is addition modulo n for n ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7, 11}. Tables 2-4 give a through
description of our cycling experiments. The tests give a conclusive proof to
the following theorems.
Theorem 4. For a fixed pair of S-boxes and for n ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7, 11} the set
of encryption permutations of a 2-round simplified version of DES over Zn
is not closed under functional composition.
Theorem 5. The simplified cipher E-DES is not pure.
Theorem 6. The group generated by the E-DES encryptions is larger than
|S49|.
6. Some group theoretic properties of
Feistel based block ciphers
In [19] it was shown that the Luby-Rackoff constructions with 4 rounds
based on the XOR operation are secure against adaptive chosen plaintext
and ciphertext attacks. These results are based on the rather strong hypoth-
esis that the round functions are random. In [24] it was shown that when
the round functions are random permutations, a 4-round Feistel network
remains secure as long as the number of queries m is very small compared
with 2t/2 (i.e. m≪ 2t/2) where 2t is the block size. One way to improve the
security of these type of Feistel networks is to use multiple encryptions.
We show that the n-round Feistel networks, n ≤ 6 with one-to-one round
functions “ do not form a group” i.e. the set of such Feistel permutations do
not form a group under functional composition. This implies that multiple
encryptions can improve the security of the 4-round Feistel networks even
when the round functions are random permutations.
Theorem 7. Let G be a finite group with |G| > 1 and let t be a positive
integer. Let X ⊂ Ft(G) be a set of functions f : G
t → Gt that does not
include the identity element. If each element of X is one-to-one then for
n ≤ 6 the set of permutations of the form Ψ2t(f1, f2, · · · , fn) where each
fi, i ≤ n is from X is not a subgroup of S|G2t|.
Proof: We prove the statement for n = 6. The proof for n < 6 is
similar. Consider the set of all permutation of the form Ψ2t(f1, f2, · · · , f6).
Assume that this set is a group under composition. Then some ǫ must be
the identity element of S|G2t|. This means that for some fixed f ∈ X, for all
(x, y) ∈ Gt ×Gt, we have Ψ2t(f1, f2, · · · , f6)(x, y) = (x, y). But then for all
x, y ∈ Gt we have
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(1) f1(y) + f3(y + f2(x+ f1(y)) + f5(y + f2(x+ f1(y)) + f4(x+ f1(y)+
+f3(y + f2(f + f1(y)))) = 0
and
(2) f2(x+ f1(y)) + f4(x+ f1(y) + f3(y + f2(x+ f1(y))) + f6(y) = 0
Put x = −f1(y) in 1 and 2 to get
(3) f1(y) + f3(y + f2(0)) + f5(y + f2(0) + f4(f3(y + f2(0))) = 0
and
(4) f2(0) + f4(f3(y + f2(0))) + f6(y) = 0
After substituting 4 into 3 and then setting y = 0 we get
f1(0) + f3 ◦ f2(x+ f1(0)) + f5 ◦ (−f6)(0) = 0
Thus, f3 ◦ f2 is a constant function. Since f2 ∈ Ft(G) is one-to-one function
one concludes that f3 must be a constant. But this contradicts the fact that
f3 is a one-to-one function
4. ♦
Generalizing classical DES, we now define for the finite group G and
positive integers t and n, n-round DES over G, denoted GDESn2t: For given
functions f1, · · · , fn the corresponding n-round GDES
n
2t permutation Tn
over the finite group (G,⊕) is the composition
Tn = P
−1 ◦ θ ◦ σfn ◦ σfn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ σf1 ◦ P
of permutations, where θ is the “swap” function
θ(x, y) = (y, x)
from G2t to G2t and P is a member of S|G2t| and P
−1 its inverse. These are




Note that θ = θ−1. In the case when the underlying group G in GDESn2t
is a group of characteristic 2, σf = σ
−1
f . For arbitrary finite groups,
σ−1f (x, y) = (x⊖ f(y), y),
where ⊖ is the inverse group operation x⊖ y = x⊕ (−y). Hence, in general,
the decryption process applies the key schedule in the reverse order, with ⊖
used instead of ⊕; that is,
T−1n = P
−1 ◦ σ−1f1 ◦ · · · ◦ σ
−1
fn
◦ θ ◦ P.
Also, note that if the round functions f1, · · · , fn are randomly and inde-
pendently chosen functions then
Tn = P
−1 ◦ θ ◦Ψn2t ◦ P
4Observe that the theorem can be strengthened by requiring only that f2 is a one-to-one
member of Ft(G), and f3 is a non-constant element of Ft(G).
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where the functions used in constructing the GDESn2t permutations are re-
stricted to come from X. We consider the effect of structure of subsets X of
((Ft(G), ⊙), ◦) on the corresponding set of GDES
n
2t(X) permutations. Note
that the initial and final permutation, P and P−1 do not affect the algebraic
structure of GDESn2t and therefore they can be omitted when examining its
algebraic properties.
Theorem 8. Let G be a finite group. Let X ⊆ Ft(G) be a set of functions
that does not include the identity element of (Ft(G),⊙). Then
(1) The set of GDES12t(X) permutations is not a subgroup of S|G2t|.
(2) The set of GDES22t(X) permutations is not a subgroup of S|G2t|.
Proof:
Consider GDES12t(X): Assume that the set {ǫ(x, y) = (x ⊕ f(y), y) :
f ∈ X}, is a group under composition. Then some ǫ must be the identity
element of S|G2t|. This means that for some fixed f ∈ X, for all (x, y) ∈
Gt ×Gt, we have (x⊕ f(y), y) = (x, y). But then for all y in Gt, f(y) = e,
the identity element of Gt, whence f is the identity element of (Ft(G),⊙).
This contradicts the fact that X does not include the identity element of
(Ft(G),⊙).
Next, consider GDES22t(X): Assume that the set of all GDES
2
2t(X) per-
mutations is a group under composition. Then there are functions f1, f2 ∈
X such that ǫ = θ ◦ σf2 ◦ σf1 is the identity element of S|G2t|. Then for each
(x, y) ∈ Gt ×Gt,
x = x⊕ f1(y) and
y = y ⊕ f2(x⊕ f1(y)).
But then for all x and y in Gt, f1(y) = f2(x) = e, the identity element of
Gt, whence f1 and f2 are the identity element of (Ft(G),⊙). This contradicts
the fact that X does not include the identity element of (Ft(G),⊙). ♦
Clearly this deductive argument improves Theorem 4 which was proven using
a computational method.
Corollary 9. For any pair of S-boxes and for n ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7, 11} the set of
encryption permutations of a 2-round simplified version of DES over Zn is
not closed under functional composition.
Using similar techniques we have shown that the set of GDESn2t(X) per-
mutations for n < 6 do not constitute a group under functional composition.
Theorem 10. Let G be a finite group and let t be a positive integer. If
X ⊆ Ft(G) is the set of all one-to-one functions X ⊆ Ft(G) then the set of
GDESn2t(X) permutations for n < 6 is not a subgroup of S|G2t|
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous two
theorems.
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Corollary 11. For each of B-DES, S-DES and E-DES, the corresponding
set of encryption permutations does not constitute a group under functional
composition.
Definition 2. The characteristic of the group (G,⊕) is the least positive
integer n such that for each x ∈ G we have nx = e.
Assuming that the group has characteristic 2 and that the set of GDESn−22t
permutations does not contain the identity element of S|G2t| we can extend
the previous result to n ≥ 6 (Theorem 12). This partially answers the ques-
tion from [16] whether the set of encryption permutations in classical DES
contains the identity element. Note that showing that the set of GDESn2t
permutations does not contain the identity element implies that it is also
not closed under functional composition.
Theorem 12. Let G be a finite group of characteristic 2. If for each
instance GDESn−22t the set of GDES
n−2
2t encryption permutations does not
contain the identity element of S|G2t|, then for each instance of GDES
n
2t
the subset of GDESn2t encryption permutations for which f1 = fn is not a
subgroup of S|G2t|.
Proof:
Recall that5 GDESn2t permutations are of the form
ǫn = θ ◦ σfn ◦ σfn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ σf2 ◦ σf1 .
Let (xi, yi) denote ǫi(x, y) for (x, y) ∈ G
t ×Gt and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Assume that
the subset of GDESn2t permutations for which f1 = fn contain the identity
element of S|G2t|.
Fix an instance of GDESn2t for which there is a key giving rise to the
sequence (f1, · · · , fn) of round functions such that f1 = fn, and the corre-
sponding GDESn2t encryption permutation is the identity function. Also fix
a key k giving rise to such a sequence (f1, · · · , fn) of round functions. Thus,
for all x, y ∈ Gt ×Gt we have ǫn(x, y) = (x, y).
Note that from this instance of GDESn2t we can define an instance of
GDESn−12t so that the key schedule of the latter is related as follows to the
key schedule of the former: For the given key k, if (k1, · · · , kn) are the n
round keys of GDESn2t, then (k
′
1, · · · , k
′
n−1) are the corresponding round keys
for GDESn−12t , where k
′
i = ki+1 for 1 ≤ i < n.




n−1 = θ◦σfn ◦σfn−1 ◦σf3 ◦...◦σf2
is the corresponding GDESn−12t encryption permutation arising from the key
k. For convenience, write (xn−1, yn−1) for ǫ
′
n−1(x, y).






i.e., for all x and y in Gt,
(5) ǫ′n−1(x, y) = (y ⊖ f1(x), x)
5Note that the initial and the final permutation don’t affect the algebraic structure of
GDESn2t
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On the other hand we can write ǫ′n−1(x, y) = θ◦σfn◦θ◦ǫ
′
n−2(x, y), where as
before ǫ′n−2 is a corresponding GDES
n−2
2t encryption permutation obtained
from the key k using the ideas above to define an instance of GDESn−22t from
the instance of GDESn−12t . Note that for all x and y in G
t,
(6) θ ◦ σfn ◦ θ(x, y) = (y ⊕ fn(x), x).
From equations (5) and (6) we see that for all x and y in Gt we have,
setting ǫ′n−2(x, y) = (xn−2, yn−2), that
(y ⊖ f1(x), x) = (yn−2 ⊕ fn(xn−2), xn−2).
Thus, for all x and y in Gt we have that xn−2 = x, and y ⊖ f1(x) =
yn−2 ⊕ fn(x). Since we assumed that f1 = fn and that the group has
characteristic 2, we find that for all y ∈ Gt, yn−2 = y. But then the
encryption permutations of this instance of GDESn−22t contain the identity
element of S|G2t|. This establishes the contrapositive of the theorem. ♦
In [2] we show when the group generated by the n-round GDESn2t permu-
tations, where the underlying Feistel network based on the binary operation
of G contains odd permutations.
Theorem 13. [2] Let G be a finite group and let n be positive integer.
If | G |t≡ 2, 3 mod 4 and t is odd then the group generated by the set of
GDESn2t encryption permutations is not a subgroup of A|G2t|.
Corollary 14. The subgroup of S318 that is generated by the set of E-DES
permutations is a group that contains as many even permutations as odd
permutations.
Based on several asymptotic results that appear in the literature ( [3],
[12], or [20]) about generating the alternating group or the symmetric group
we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. The group generated by the set of E-DES permutations is
S318 .
Theorem 15. Let G be a subgroup of the finite group H. If there is
an S-box set for G such that the corresponding set of GDES22t encryption
permutations do not constitute a group, then there is an S-box set for H
such that the corresponding set of HDES22t encryption permutations do not
constitute a group.
Proof: Let S-boxes S1, · · · , Sn for GDES
2
2t be given such that the set
of encryption permutations of GDES22t defined from these S-boxes does not
constitute a group under composition. We may assume that t = j ·n, while
round key lengths are (i + j)·n. Thus each of these S-boxes has |Gi| rows
and |Gj | columns. Each of the row entries is an element of Gj . We may
assume that each of the |G|i rows is indexed by an element of Gi and each
of the |G|j columns is indexed by elements of the set Gj .
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Now expand each S-box Sp to an S-box Rp as follows: Adjoin |H
i| − |Gi|
additional rows, and |Hj | − |Gj | additional columns to obtain an |H i|-by-
|Hj| array such that the top left |Gi|-by-|Gj | corner is the given S-box Sm,
and the remaining entries are all from Hj \Gj . The additional rows are now
indexed by elements of H i \Gi, and the additional columns are indexed by
elements of Hj \Gj .
Claim: The set of HDES22t permutations arising from the S-boxes R1, · · · , Rn
does not constitute a group under functional composition.
For assume the contrary. Let k1 and k2 be GDES
2
2t keys such that Tk2Tk1
is not of the form Tk3for some GDES
2
2t key k3. Observe that the set of
GDES22t keys is subset of the set of HDES
2
2t keys, and that the set of GDES
2
2t
plaintexts is a subset of the set of HDES22t plaintexts.
By our hypothesis there is an HDES22t key k, fixed from now on, such that
Tk2Tk1 = Tk.
By the choice of the keys k1 and k2 it follows that k has an entry from H \G.
It also follows that there is a plaintext m ∈ G2t such that during encryption
of m using Tk, in some of the two Feistel rounds an entry of k which is in
H \G is used, for otherwise we may modify k so that all entries are from G
and still have Tk2Tk1 = Tk, contradicting the choice of k1 and k2.
Encryption of m by Tk2Tk1 : Let mℓ denote the left half of m and let mr
denote the right half of m. Consider E(mr), the expansion of mr, used in
specifications of the encryption algorithm GDES22t in use.
In round 1 of Tk1 we see that the first step is m
1





is the first round subkey. Now all (i + j) · n entries of m11 are elements of
G, and thus point to entries of the S-boxes S1, · · · , Sn, so that the output
of this round is another element, e11, of G
2t. Completing the second round
of Tk1 produces an element e
1
2 of G
2t, which is input of Tk2 . By similar
considerations the result of applying Tk2 to e
1
2 is the element Tk2Tk1(m) of
G2t.
Encryption of m by Tk: Now consider the destiny of m under the encryption
permutation Tk. By our earlier remark about the use of entries of k during
the encryption process, for some round j ≤ 2, the round key kj has an entry
in H \ G which is used in that round. Let j denotes the first round when
this occurs.
Case 1: j=1. The input to round 1 is m ∈ G2t. With E(mr) the expansion
of the right half to an (i + j)·n sequence from G, m1 = E(mr)⊕ k
1 has an
entry from H \ G as it is a group element of H obtained from the group
operation of an element of the subgroup G with an element not in G. But
then m1 points, for some S-box Rp either at a row beyond the |G
i|-th, or at
a column beyond the |Gj |-th. By the construction of the expanded S-boxes
over H, the return from this S-box consists of j-nits from Hj \Gj , and thus
the output from this step is e1, which has n · j nits, and one of the n blocks
of consecutive nits has an entry from H \ G. The output from this round
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then is of the form a list of length 2·t with first t entries mr, the right half
of the original message, a member of Gt, and mℓ ⊕ e1 which is a member
of Ht \ Gt. After the second round of the encryption using the key k we
find that the right half of the output ciphertext still is mℓ ⊕ e1, and so the
result of the encryption is not a member of G2t, contradicting that for all
m, Tk2Tk1(m) = Tk(m).
Case 2: j=2. The output of the first round of Tk is an element of G
2t.
Thus the input to round 2 is an M ∈ G2t. Let Mℓdenote the left t nits of
M , and Mr the right t nits. Let E(Mr) be the expansion of the right half
to an (i+ j)·n sequence from G. Then M1 = E(Mr)⊕ k
2 has an entry from
H \ G as it is a group element of H obtained from the group operation of
an element of the subgroup G with an element not in G.
But then M1 points, for some S-box Rp either at a row beyond the |G
i|-
th, or at a column beyond the |Gj |-th. By the construction of the expanded
S-boxes over H, the return from this S-box consists of j-nits including some
from H \ G. Thus the return from the S-boxes is an element of Ht \ Gt,
say e. But then Mℓ ⊕ e still is a member of H
t \ Gt as G is a subgroup
of H. Since this is the right half of the output from the second round of
the encryption using the key k, it follows that Tk(m) ∈ H
2t \G2t, and thus
Tk2Tk1(m) 6= Tk(m), a contradiction.
It follows that set of encryption permutations of HDES22t with the S-boxes
R1, · · · , Rn does not constitute a group. ♦
The following corollary follows directly from the previous theorem.
Corollary 16. Let G be an arbitrary finite group. If there is an S-box set
for GDES22t encryption permutations do not constitute a group, then for any
finite group H there is an S-box set such that the set of UDES22t encryption
permutations where U = G×H do not constitute a group.
Note that the last |H|i − |G|i rows of the S-boxes R1, · · · , Rn appearing
in the proof of Theorem 15 do not contain any members of Gj , and thus are
not permutations of members of Hj . We conjecture that expansions of the
original set n of S-boxes can be found such that if the rows of the original
S-boxes were permutations of Gj , then the rows of the expanded S-boxes
will be permutations of Hj, and the theorem would hold.
7. Conclusions and future work
This paper is a study of DES-like ciphers over arbitrary finite groups. We
introduced a new simplified version of DES based on the finite group Z3. We
showed that its set of encryption permutations does not form a group under
functional composition. Corollary 9 indicates that this result is not particu-
lar to the underlying group Z3. Theorem 8 shows that this conclusion holds
for arbitrary finite groups. Our proof of this fact deviates from former com-
putationally intensive methods by being a purely deductive proof. Before
we discovered our deductive proof we also used the cycling closure test as
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was used in the case of DES for the same question. All examples of DES-like
cryptosystems are based on commutative groups. Though Theorem 8 ap-
plies also to this case, we have not yet explored potential new complications
that may arise when a version of DES is based on a non-commutative group.
The group generated by this simplified DES cipher is not the alternating
group as opposed to the group generated by the one-round functions of the
classical DES and other block ciphers that generate the alternating group.
It would be interesting to determine which finite groups can be the group
generated by the set of encryption permutations of a DES-like cipher.
We showed that the n-round Feistel networks, n ≤ 6 with one-to-one
round functions “do not form a group” i.e. the set of such Feistel permuta-
tions do not form a group under functional composition. It will be useful to
know whether one can extend this result to hold for any number of rounds
and based on any group operation in the underlying Feistel network. Our
results motivate a need for re-examining the DES-like ciphers to determine
the extent to which the old results hold when we consider arbitrary finite
algebraic structures.
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Appendix A. Cycling Experiments









8 with random S-boxes, initial and final permutation and expansion
function that meet their standard architectural requirements of Feistel based
cryptosystems.
Table 2: Computing | {T rkj (mi) : r = 1, 2, · · · } |
G mi kj orb(mi) lcm(orb(mi) : i ∈ N)
Z2 130 823 31
212 963 37 1147 > 28
Z3 5838 41155 2526
5580 37372 1739 4392714 > 38
Z5 177954 2817216 8350
240687 6114274 46728 195089400 > 58
Z7 4903806 161418036 1377440
4684968 104555592 3014559 4152374148960 > 78
Z11 40015435 4533979344 106572673
110072914 25730291171 19064231 2031726056359463 > 118
Table 3: Purity experiment for E-DES
m eK dK orb(m)
67681038 22933471 1402043471 12802413
884024783 1402043471 9625730992 254125864
Table 4 : Small subgroup experiment for E-DES
mi kj orb(mi)
0 4533979344 134282729
0 1402043471 216589023
6021247 1402043471 201375970
746014783 0 62909599
580027391 0 201375970
442017391 1402043471 134282729
746014783 1402043471 18939453
872037801 1402043471 68600442
67681038 1402043471 134282729
